As I wrote in my last reading response I mentioned that I found the way Stoljar differentiates between o and t-type physicalism confusing. Although this has since been cleared up some I still cannot quite reconcile myself to the idea of o-type physicalism being physicalism. Brittany did a great job of showing us how Stoljar responds to the arguments against o-type physicalism actually being physicalism. I still have my doubts about what Stoljar says, mostly because I myself fins issue with physicalism itself. Chalmer’s claims of o-type physicalism being panpsychism are something I would like to explore more mostly because I do think that Chalmers might be on to something in regards to the differentiation between the two. This is mostly due to the fact that even after reading all of these writings I find the difference between o and t-type to be small at best and that in many ways one can say they are almost the same thing just that Stoljar has chosen his words very carefully so as to be able to say that there is a difference. When we read Chalmers taxonomy I found myself drawn to the dualism argument that Chalmers put forward. What I wonder then is how Stoljar would respond to dualism in contrast to physicalism. Would he be able to respond to Chalmers idea of dualism or would he just dismiss it entirely?

Stoljar "Two Conceptions of the Physical" Pt. 2

Let's review what we've already learned about Stoljar ...

Section 1:

A tetrad of theses makes up the contemporary debate on philosophy of mind:

(1) If physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true

a. True by considerations of supervenience

(2) A priori physicalism is false

a. True by considerations of epistemic distinctness

(3) If physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true

a. True by considerations of causal closure

(4) Epiphenomenalism is false

a. True by considerations of evidence

Stoljar’s project is to show how (1-4) can all be true based on two different conceptions of the physical and to defend a version of physicalism using that theory.

Section 2:

Theory-based conception of the physical (t-physicalism)

- “A physical property is a property which either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about”

- Physical theory only tells us about dispositional properties.

o If a vase is fragile, it is disposed to break.

o The characteristic of being easily broken is the dispositional property

Object-based conception of the physical (o-physicalism)

- “A physical property is a property which either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents.”

- Dispositional properties of physical objects require categorical properties

o If a vase is fragile, there must be some non-dispositional property that makes it the case that the vase is disposed to break.

o The characteristic of being easily broken is the categorical property that the vase has, given it’s dispositional qualities (i.e., being made out of porcelain, being hollow)

The source of the problem: some o-physicals are not t-physical.

Say physical object x has dispositional physical property F and non-dispositional property G.

Is G a physical property?

- T-physicalism says no.

- O-physicalism says sure, why not?

Section 3:

How we interpret physicalism has no bearing on the reasons for (1) or (4), but it does affect the reasons for (2) and (3).

Reinterpreting “(2) A priori physicalism is false”

- (2-t) A priori t-physicalism is false

o (5-t) Mary, before her release, knows everything t-physical there is to know about other people

o (6) Mary, before her release, does not know everything physical there is to know about other people

§ Only proves that a priori t-physicalism is false, not a priori o-physicalism

§ If Mary knows everything t-physical about the world, it does not mean that she knows everything o-physical about the world, thus it does not follow that when she learns something about the world that she learns something non-physical

- (2-o) A priori o-physicalism is false

o (5-o) Mary, before her release, knows everything o-physical there is to know about other people

o (6) Mary, before her release, does not know everything physical there is to know about other people

§ O-physicalism would not accept the argument at all, because it could not accept (5-o)

§ Mary could not learn everything o-physical there is to know from inside her cell because there are some categorical physical properties that are not encompassed by physical theory

Conclusion: A priori t-physicalism is false

Section 4:

Reinterpreting “(3) If physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true”

- (3-t) If t-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true

o (8) For all physical events e, if there is an event e* such that e* causes e, then e* is a physical event

o (9-t) For all physical events e and e*, if there is a property F such that F is causally efficacious in e’s causing e*, then F is a t-physical property.

§ Implausible to suggest that the efficacy of dispositional properties has nothing to do with the efficacy of their categorical grounds

- (3-o) If o-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true

o (8) For all physical events e, if there is an event e* such that e* causes e, then e* is a physical event

o (9-t) For all physical events e and e*, if there is a property F such that F is causally efficacious in e’s causing e*, then F is an o-physical property.

Conclusion: If o-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true.

So, the new tetrad of theses goes like this:

(1) If physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true

(2) A priori t-physicalism is false

(3) If o-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true.

(4) Epiphenomenalism is false.

Now, onto the new stuff …

Section 5:

If we accept the theory-based conception, we can regard (2) as false and (3) as true.

If we accept the object-based conception, we can regard (2) as true and (3) as false.

In either case, there is no inconsistency between (1-4), and a physicalist theory can still stand.

Two classes of objections to Stojar’s argument

(i) Questions the thesis that dispositions require categorical grounds and the thesis that physical theory only tells us about physical properties, two assumptions upon which Stoljar’s argument rests.

(ii) Raises questions about the position we are left with if we are to accept Stoljar’s theory.

Stoljar puts aside the first class of objections and focuses on the second.

The triangle/circle analogy:

A mosaic is made up of triangles and “pie-pieces”. Using these fundamental building blocks, other shapes are made; squares, half-moons, rhombuses, etc.

Access to the mosaic is limited to two shape-detecting systems. One detects triangles, the second detects circles.

People assume that the triangle detector tell us everything there is to know about the mosaic, but they struggle to reconcile that belief with the information from the circle detector. They develop lots of theories to do this, but all the theories are wrong for the same reason: they rest on the assumption that the triangle-detector tells us everything about the mosaic, when in addition there are also pie pieces. The pie pieces themselves are not circles, but in combination they constitute circles.

T-Physical, o-physical, and qualia are like triangles, pie pieces and circles, respectively.

Physical theory does not tell us everything about the physical world. It only tells us about dispositional t-physical properties when in addition there are also categorical o-physical properties. Categorical o-physical properties themselves are not qualia, but in combination with themselves and t-physical properties, they may constitute qualia.

This Russell-inspired position (o-physicalism) has two parts

(i) The physical part- qualia supervene not on the t-physical properties alone, but on the t-physical properties and o-physical properties

(ii) The a priori part- mental truths are a priori entailed by physical truths

Objection 1: Is This Really Physicalism?

Main Objection: Is o-physicalism really physicalism?

- Chalmers says that the theory Stoljar champions is monism, specifically either panpsychism or neutral monism.

- If this is correct, Stoljar’s project of resolving physicalism fails, because we would have solved the debate just by giving up physicalism.

Main Response: Objection misses the distinction between the theory-based and object-based conception of the physical.

- In effect, Chalmers operates only from the t-physical conception and must therefore claim that any property that is not t-physical is not a physical property and therefore either must be a mental property or a neutral property.

Is o-physicalism neutral monism?

- Neutral properties are those that are neither t-physical nor mental.

- In this sense, o-physical properties are “neutral”, but Stoljar says that this does not invalidate neutral properties as being physicalist. To declare that neutral properties under this definition are not physical is to fail to distinguish between t-physicalism and o-physicalism.

What if we reject o-physicalism and operate only from a t-physicalist theory?

- The distinction between neutral monism and physicalism becomes clear

- BUT if physicalists want a version of physicalism compatible with certain metaphysical assumptions about dispositions (namely, that they require categorical grounds), they must accept o-physicalism.

So, it does not matter that o-physicalism fits the definition of neutral monism, because neutral monism fails to differentiate itself from physicalism.

Is o-physicalism panpsychism?

- According to panpsychism, the categorical properties which underlie dispositional t-physical properties are in every case qualia. The result is that all physical objects instantiate qualia just as we do. This stance comes from two ideas:

o The only physical properties are t-physical properties

o Categorical properties comes from concepts of qualia. Or in other words, categorical properties come with the subjective view.

- O-physicalism inherently rejects the first idea.

- Even if one accepts the second idea, it does not follow that all categorical properties are qualitative properties.

o Kripke’s duck example: Even if a person derives his concept of ducks from the ducks in Central Park, it does not follow that the concept derived does not apply to ducks not in Central Park.

- One can at least imagine a range of properties that are both physical and non-qualitative. These are the categorical properties, or o-physical properties.

So, there is no reason to believe o-physicalism is panpsychism.

Objection 2: Concepts Unattainable?

Is it so that qualitative truths are a priori entailed by physical truths?

- Objection: O-physicalism requires that we accept a class of concepts that cannot be formulated using concepts we currently possess

o Cannot be t-concepts (concepts which tell us about t-physical properties) because t-concepts do not explain what is explained by concepts of qualia.

o Cannot be qualia because the central point of o-physicalism is that the concepts are physical, not qualitative.

o So, they must be o-concepts, concepts which tell us about the categorical o-properties.

- Response: The fact that o-physicalism requires a class of concepts which we do not currently possess is not in and of itself a valid objection against the view of o-physicalism.

- Objection: Not only do we not possess o-concepts, no possible being could possess them.

o Response: We know we can possess concepts that are relevantly like o-concepts, because we can possess concepts of qualia. So there is no reason to believe that we cannot possess concepts of categorical properties of physical objects, because we already possess similar concepts.

- Objection: The idea of o-concepts is incoherent, on the grounds that it is simply incoherent to suppose that physical truths could a priori entail qualitative truths

o Response: There are no arguments for this objection. It does not follow that just because t-physical properties are not equivalent to concepts of qualia, o-physical properties could not be either.

§ In other words, the knowledge argument proves t-physicalism is false, but not that o-physicalism is false.

Objection 3: The Grain Problem

Objection: A person has a visual experience of a smooth, continuous expanse of red. How could a potentially non-continuous and unsmooth myriad of o-physical properties combine together to entail a smooth, continuous expanse of red?

- At least some mental events exemplify structural properties that are not exemplified by any brain event

- The view threatens to show that collection of o-physical properties cannot constitute qualia.

Response: Grain problem gets the phemenology wrong.

- The experience represents an expanse as being smooth and continuous, but it does not follow that the experience itself is not smooth and continuous.

What does this even mean??

- Picture the color red.

- Unless otherwise directed (i.e., if I said, “picture red dots” or “picture a red, bumpy surface”), your visual experience probably depicted a smooth, continuous expanse of red.

- So the grain problem asks why is it that with all our experiences of the color red, experiences that involved textures that were not smooth and swaths of color that were not continuous, when asked to picture red do we picture something we’ve never actually experienced? Even if we’ve stood in front of a red wall, or zoomed in on the paint of a red car, we have never had the mental experience that is exactly like the one we have when we picture red.

Objection: It is obvious in introspection that one’s experience of a red expanse is itself smooth and continuous. It does not simply represent an expanse as being so.

Response: Introspection reveals the intentional objects of experience to us, but not the experiences themselves. In this way, introspection has a sort of “diaphanous” quality to it. (Moore)

- When we introspect the sensation of red, all we see is the smooth, continuous expanse of red. The experience itself is diaphanous.

Objection: To accept the idea of diaphonousness is to undercut the idea that there are qualia in the first place.

Response: It is perfectly reasonable to develop a theory which gets at the same idea Moore was getting at while postulating the idea of qualia. (Shoemaker).

- An experience of a red expanse represents the expanse as having two properties- the property of being red, and what Shoemaker calls a phenomenal property, the property of causing an r-quale (where an r-quale is the type of quale typically produced by red things)

- As this relates to the grain problem: The experience of the smooth expanse has represents the expanse as having two properties: the property of being smooth, and the property of causing an s-quale (where an s-quale is the type of quale typically produced by smooth things)

Welcome to Our Virtual Classroom

You'll recall -- if you were in class on Thursday -- that class is canceled on 11/23. Or, at least, we won't be meeting. Instead, we're going to use this blog. Here's how it will work.

Brittany is scheduled to present on the second half of Stoljar's paper. She'll do this online with an initial blog post and by moderating the ensuing discussion. To get things started, I will (as I often do at the beginning of class) provide a recap of the first half of the paper, which we covered yesterday.

Your role, unless you're Brittany, is to comment on Brittany's post in a way that engages substantively with the issues raised and contributes to the ongoing discussion. If you do this, then you'll get credit for attending class and for making an in-class contribution. If you don't do this, then it will count as an unexcused absence from class. All discussion should be concluded by the end of the day on Thanksgiving, and you can expect Brittany's post to be up by Tuesday at 2:30 PM.

If you have any questions about this, please raise them in a comment on this post.