Section 1:
A tetrad of theses makes up the contemporary debate on philosophy of mind:
(1) If physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true
a. True by considerations of supervenience
(2) A priori physicalism is false
a. True by considerations of epistemic distinctness
(3) If physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true
a. True by considerations of causal closure
(4) Epiphenomenalism is false
a. True by considerations of evidence
Stoljar’s project is to show how (1-4) can all be true based on two different conceptions of the physical and to defend a version of physicalism using that theory.
Section 2:
Theory-based conception of the physical (t-physicalism)
- “A physical property is a property which either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about”
- Physical theory only tells us about dispositional properties.
o If a vase is fragile, it is disposed to break.
o The characteristic of being easily broken is the dispositional property
Object-based conception of the physical (o-physicalism)
- “A physical property is a property which either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents.”
- Dispositional properties of physical objects require categorical properties
o If a vase is fragile, there must be some non-dispositional property that makes it the case that the vase is disposed to break.
o The characteristic of being easily broken is the categorical property that the vase has, given it’s dispositional qualities (i.e., being made out of porcelain, being hollow)
The source of the problem: some o-physicals are not t-physical.
Say physical object x has dispositional physical property F and non-dispositional property G.
Is G a physical property?
- T-physicalism says no.
- O-physicalism says sure, why not?
Section 3:
How we interpret physicalism has no bearing on the reasons for (1) or (4), but it does affect the reasons for (2) and (3).
Reinterpreting “(2) A priori physicalism is false”
- (2-t) A priori t-physicalism is false
o (5-t) Mary, before her release, knows everything t-physical there is to know about other people
o (6) Mary, before her release, does not know everything physical there is to know about other people
§ Only proves that a priori t-physicalism is false, not a priori o-physicalism
§ If Mary knows everything t-physical about the world, it does not mean that she knows everything o-physical about the world, thus it does not follow that when she learns something about the world that she learns something non-physical
- (2-o) A priori o-physicalism is false
o (5-o) Mary, before her release, knows everything o-physical there is to know about other people
o (6) Mary, before her release, does not know everything physical there is to know about other people
§ O-physicalism would not accept the argument at all, because it could not accept (5-o)
§ Mary could not learn everything o-physical there is to know from inside her cell because there are some categorical physical properties that are not encompassed by physical theory
Conclusion: A priori t-physicalism is false
Section 4:
Reinterpreting “(3) If physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true”
- (3-t) If t-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true
o (8) For all physical events e, if there is an event e* such that e* causes e, then e* is a physical event
o (9-t) For all physical events e and e*, if there is a property F such that F is causally efficacious in e’s causing e*, then F is a t-physical property.
§ Implausible to suggest that the efficacy of dispositional properties has nothing to do with the efficacy of their categorical grounds
- (3-o) If o-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true
o (8) For all physical events e, if there is an event e* such that e* causes e, then e* is a physical event
o (9-t) For all physical events e and e*, if there is a property F such that F is causally efficacious in e’s causing e*, then F is an o-physical property.
Conclusion: If o-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true.
So, the new tetrad of theses goes like this:
(1) If physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true
(2) A priori t-physicalism is false
(3) If o-physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true.
(4) Epiphenomenalism is false.
Now, onto the new stuff …
Section 5:
If we accept the theory-based conception, we can regard (2) as false and (3) as true.
If we accept the object-based conception, we can regard (2) as true and (3) as false.
In either case, there is no inconsistency between (1-4), and a physicalist theory can still stand.
Two classes of objections to Stojar’s argument
(i) Questions the thesis that dispositions require categorical grounds and the thesis that physical theory only tells us about physical properties, two assumptions upon which Stoljar’s argument rests.
(ii) Raises questions about the position we are left with if we are to accept Stoljar’s theory.
Stoljar puts aside the first class of objections and focuses on the second.
The triangle/circle analogy:
A mosaic is made up of triangles and “pie-pieces”. Using these fundamental building blocks, other shapes are made; squares, half-moons, rhombuses, etc.
Access to the mosaic is limited to two shape-detecting systems. One detects triangles, the second detects circles.
People assume that the triangle detector tell us everything there is to know about the mosaic, but they struggle to reconcile that belief with the information from the circle detector. They develop lots of theories to do this, but all the theories are wrong for the same reason: they rest on the assumption that the triangle-detector tells us everything about the mosaic, when in addition there are also pie pieces. The pie pieces themselves are not circles, but in combination they constitute circles.
T-Physical, o-physical, and qualia are like triangles, pie pieces and circles, respectively.
Physical theory does not tell us everything about the physical world. It only tells us about dispositional t-physical properties when in addition there are also categorical o-physical properties. Categorical o-physical properties themselves are not qualia, but in combination with themselves and t-physical properties, they may constitute qualia.
This Russell-inspired position (o-physicalism) has two parts
(i) The physical part- qualia supervene not on the t-physical properties alone, but on the t-physical properties and o-physical properties
(ii) The a priori part- mental truths are a priori entailed by physical truths
Objection 1: Is This Really Physicalism?
Main Objection: Is o-physicalism really physicalism?
- Chalmers says that the theory Stoljar champions is monism, specifically either panpsychism or neutral monism.
- If this is correct, Stoljar’s project of resolving physicalism fails, because we would have solved the debate just by giving up physicalism.
Main Response: Objection misses the distinction between the theory-based and object-based conception of the physical.
- In effect, Chalmers operates only from the t-physical conception and must therefore claim that any property that is not t-physical is not a physical property and therefore either must be a mental property or a neutral property.
Is o-physicalism neutral monism?
- Neutral properties are those that are neither t-physical nor mental.
- In this sense, o-physical properties are “neutral”, but Stoljar says that this does not invalidate neutral properties as being physicalist. To declare that neutral properties under this definition are not physical is to fail to distinguish between t-physicalism and o-physicalism.
What if we reject o-physicalism and operate only from a t-physicalist theory?
- The distinction between neutral monism and physicalism becomes clear
- BUT if physicalists want a version of physicalism compatible with certain metaphysical assumptions about dispositions (namely, that they require categorical grounds), they must accept o-physicalism.
So, it does not matter that o-physicalism fits the definition of neutral monism, because neutral monism fails to differentiate itself from physicalism.
Is o-physicalism panpsychism?
- According to panpsychism, the categorical properties which underlie dispositional t-physical properties are in every case qualia. The result is that all physical objects instantiate qualia just as we do. This stance comes from two ideas:
o The only physical properties are t-physical properties
o Categorical properties comes from concepts of qualia. Or in other words, categorical properties come with the subjective view.
- O-physicalism inherently rejects the first idea.
- Even if one accepts the second idea, it does not follow that all categorical properties are qualitative properties.
o Kripke’s duck example: Even if a person derives his concept of ducks from the ducks in Central Park, it does not follow that the concept derived does not apply to ducks not in Central Park.
- One can at least imagine a range of properties that are both physical and non-qualitative. These are the categorical properties, or o-physical properties.
So, there is no reason to believe o-physicalism is panpsychism.
Objection 2: Concepts Unattainable?
Is it so that qualitative truths are a priori entailed by physical truths?
- Objection: O-physicalism requires that we accept a class of concepts that cannot be formulated using concepts we currently possess
o Cannot be t-concepts (concepts which tell us about t-physical properties) because t-concepts do not explain what is explained by concepts of qualia.
o Cannot be qualia because the central point of o-physicalism is that the concepts are physical, not qualitative.
o So, they must be o-concepts, concepts which tell us about the categorical o-properties.
- Response: The fact that o-physicalism requires a class of concepts which we do not currently possess is not in and of itself a valid objection against the view of o-physicalism.
- Objection: Not only do we not possess o-concepts, no possible being could possess them.
o Response: We know we can possess concepts that are relevantly like o-concepts, because we can possess concepts of qualia. So there is no reason to believe that we cannot possess concepts of categorical properties of physical objects, because we already possess similar concepts.
- Objection: The idea of o-concepts is incoherent, on the grounds that it is simply incoherent to suppose that physical truths could a priori entail qualitative truths
o Response: There are no arguments for this objection. It does not follow that just because t-physical properties are not equivalent to concepts of qualia, o-physical properties could not be either.
§ In other words, the knowledge argument proves t-physicalism is false, but not that o-physicalism is false.
Objection 3: The Grain Problem
Objection: A person has a visual experience of a smooth, continuous expanse of red. How could a potentially non-continuous and unsmooth myriad of o-physical properties combine together to entail a smooth, continuous expanse of red?
- At least some mental events exemplify structural properties that are not exemplified by any brain event
- The view threatens to show that collection of o-physical properties cannot constitute qualia.
Response: Grain problem gets the phemenology wrong.
- The experience represents an expanse as being smooth and continuous, but it does not follow that the experience itself is not smooth and continuous.
What does this even mean??
- Picture the color red.
- Unless otherwise directed (i.e., if I said, “picture red dots” or “picture a red, bumpy surface”), your visual experience probably depicted a smooth, continuous expanse of red.
- So the grain problem asks why is it that with all our experiences of the color red, experiences that involved textures that were not smooth and swaths of color that were not continuous, when asked to picture red do we picture something we’ve never actually experienced? Even if we’ve stood in front of a red wall, or zoomed in on the paint of a red car, we have never had the mental experience that is exactly like the one we have when we picture red.
Objection: It is obvious in introspection that one’s experience of a red expanse is itself smooth and continuous. It does not simply represent an expanse as being so.
Response: Introspection reveals the intentional objects of experience to us, but not the experiences themselves. In this way, introspection has a sort of “diaphanous” quality to it. (Moore)
- When we introspect the sensation of red, all we see is the smooth, continuous expanse of red. The experience itself is diaphanous.
Objection: To accept the idea of diaphonousness is to undercut the idea that there are qualia in the first place.
Response: It is perfectly reasonable to develop a theory which gets at the same idea Moore was getting at while postulating the idea of qualia. (Shoemaker).
- An experience of a red expanse represents the expanse as having two properties- the property of being red, and what Shoemaker calls a phenomenal property, the property of causing an r-quale (where an r-quale is the type of quale typically produced by red things)
- As this relates to the grain problem: The experience of the smooth expanse has represents the expanse as having two properties: the property of being smooth, and the property of causing an s-quale (where an s-quale is the type of quale typically produced by smooth things)
I would still ask exactly what it is that makes o-physical properties physical at all. They don't seem very physical, and there's really no reason (in my opinion) to accept them as such. Sure, maybe we can imagine the concept of o-physical properties, but is this enough to say they really exist? Stoljar doesn't provide any precise examples of what an o-physical property could be--he simply insists on their existence, and responds to criticisms like this one by saying that we "miss the point" about the distinction between "t" and "o" physicalism. I don't think there's enough evidence here for Stoljar to propose the existence of an entire category of physical properties--I get the feeling he's doing this more for the purpose of reconciling these views than for the purpose of expanding our understanding of physical phenomena. So, in a nutshell, I'm asking why we should accept that there is such a thing as o-physical properties at all. If we do, why should we accept that they are physical?
ReplyDeleteThanks to Brittany for this excellent presentation posting on Stoljar's paper, which, I can tell, is controversial!
ReplyDeleteI think there may be some issues with Brittany's interpretation of what's going on in the final objection, but otherwise the content here is really solid. One small point, though: in section 2, she writes:
"Dispositional properties of physical objects require categorical properties
o If a vase is fragile, there must be some non-dispositional property that makes it the case that the vase is disposed to break.
o The characteristic of being easily broken is the categorical property that the vase has, given it’s dispositional qualities (i.e., being made out of porcelain, being hollow)"
This isn't quite right. The last point should read: "The characteristic of being easily broken is the dispositional property that the vase has, given its categorical properties...."
I should add that, if you're thinking of writing on this stuff, then it would be worth taking a look at Stoljar's SEP entry on physicalism, here:
ReplyDeletehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
This is somewhat in response to what Shane said, because I have a similar issue. As far as I can tell, Stoljar's definition of an o-physical property as "a physical property which... is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects..." (313) and Chalmer's definition of phenomenal properties in his discussion of type-F monism (265) seem almost identical. Since phenomenal properties are, by definition, non-physical, it seems that Stoljar has a bit of justifying to do in an explanation of why we should suppose that o-phsyical properties are indeed physical at all.
ReplyDeleteI have to agree with Shane about the concept of o-physical properties. I looked at this in my reading response that questioned if Stoljar's o-physicalism could really be considered a form of physicalism. I understand that dispositional properties are properties that are understood in terms of their effects and that they supervene (or presuppose) on some categorical property/properties (which are the true fundamental properties of an object in virtue of which it has dispositional properties). But I noticed that Stoljar did
ReplyDeletenot go any farther in really describing these categorical properties (I called them "super-fundamental properties" in my response), let alone provide any examples of them. Furthermore, not a single example of them has been observed/discovered in the physical, non-theoretical world.
I had claimed that these o-physical (or categorical) properties could very well be denied to be physical and instead be labeled as mental properties. All that really seemed to be made certain, at least within the scope of Stoljar's work, was that o-physical properties are more fundamental than t-physical properties (dispositional properties). I also noted that
Stoljar escapes having to exemplify/further clarify o-physical properties because science/physical theory can only identify/analyze t-physical properties (and not
o-physical). So, it seemed to me that it is just as valid to claim that these "superfundamental" properties could be called o-mental properties. Since there is no evidence for or against whether or not these superfundamental properties are t-physical properties (to my knowledge), I cannot say that Stoljar's claim is invalid. But, the same can be said about my claim on labeling these superfundamental properties as o-mental properties (there's no evidence for or against that either). Also, since science cannot shed light upon the details of these uperfundamental properties, it appears we may not know if they are physical, mental, or either for a long time. These properties are highly abstract, and it seems that Stoljar’s want/desire to preserve physicalism has him claim that these very super-fundamental properties are physical when they could very possibly be mental properties. While his desire is understandable, it is not definite or free from any objection, but if his o-physicalism really is o-mentalism (however weak a form of mentalism that may be), then his reconception of the physical may prove to incorrect.
Also, I noted that I had to (in a sense, blindly) accept whatever claims Stoljar accepted about the identity/existence of categorical properties. The works/texts he based his theory off of may very well be flawed/contain some problems, and if this is so, his theory is flawed as a result.
“…neutral monism as usually defined presupposes the theory-based conception of the physical...and neutral monism is the thesis...that mental and t-physical properties metaphysically supervene on neutral properties...So the charge that o-physicalism is not a version of physicalism rests on a failure to distinguish the two conceptions of the physical” (Chalmers 320). This was Stoljar's defense as to why his view was not Monism. I found that it worked, BUT, I still can raise the questions/objections in my earlier prompt.
ReplyDeleteHappy Thanksgiving!!
ReplyDeleteDoes this count as participation?
Just kidding.
While I don't really like how Stoljar responds to objections, and I don't believe his concept of o-physicalism counts as a form of physicalism, I do agree with him about the general ideas of o-physical properties. I agree that an object must have some intrinsic properties that underly the dispositional properties that it has. For example, in the Grain Problem, the objection is that when you picture red you picture a smooth vast expanse of the color red (side note: I don't believe this is true for everyone, for example, when I picture red I picture a firetruck). The objection asks the question of why you would picture this, instead of the vast myriad of un-smooth red surfaces you have seen throughout your life. People who object to this would say that it then follows that o-physical properties cannot constitute qualia, since this vast expanse of smooth red is something we haven't actually ever experienced. I agree with Stoljar's response that the mental thought of experiencing red does not constitute the exact feeling of experiencing red, it is merely a representation of experiencing red. In introspection, the intentional objects of experience are not revealed to us, just a representation of them. But is this to say then that because when we think of red we only think of a vast smooth expanse of red, we don't know the experience of red? I don't think so. (And as I said before, I have a problem with this objection to begin with because it is not necessarily so that when you tell someone to think of red they think of a vast expanse of red. Many people, myself in particular, often think of a red object they have seen or experienced and draw the feelings of the experience of seeing red from the object which they saw it on.)
I'm just going to jump out on a limb and try to defend Stoljar a little here. A vase cannot break unless it is fragile, or brittle, or too thin to be strong. The point is that all of those characteristics are physical - o-physical, to be exact. Why is it so hard to imagine that those properties are considered separate from the dispositional ones? The fact that a vase will break IF it is fragile, brittle, etc., is also a physical thing. There is nothing mental about either of these conceptions. Why should Stoljar have to prove that? I don't agree with Shane when he says that these categorical properties don't seem physical.
ReplyDeleteHappy Thanksgiving!
ReplyDeleteApparently I mixed this philosophy blog up with the intro class and thought I needed to comment by Friday. Hopefully this still counts, but regardless, I am going to comment. I think that all of the arguments people have made so far are valid ones. First off I believe as do many others that Stoljar's description of t-physical and o-physical properties is extremely vague and confusing. I do not think he makes any clear distinction between the two and it honestly seems as if they are just two different words for the same concepts. Granted one is supposed to dispose the other- they seem to be the same things. Another comment that was made by Alex, concerned the mental or qualitative properties Stoljar's o-physical properties seem to have. I also agree with this comment. I believe that these o-physical properties sound an awful lot like qualia. If this is true, then again, how could this be physicalism.
Stoljar in my opinion, is trying to break up physicalism in a way that cannot be. You cannot break up physical properties into completely different types of properties that rely on different rules. I do understand if someone wanted to distinguish between physical properties that seem different, but one cannot say that they function by different rules and can work in completely different ways. One kind of physical property can not allow for epiphenomonalism and another not. That is just ridiculous. Physicalism cannot be false or true. It cannot have parts that are false and parts that are true. Physicalism must either be false or true.
My problem with Stoljar has much less to do with dividing physicalism into two types, one which cannot be proved at this time. My problem lies in that even if you assume that Type O Physicalism exists, why is that the most fundamental level? There does not seem to be anything necessitating that Type O physicalism is the most fundamental, merely that it is more basic than Type T. Going on the triangle, pie, circle example, lines and points are more fundamental than the shapes themselves. It almost seems like he's making the shape or matter more important than what actually causes the matter (or makes it up).
ReplyDelete(I'm typing from my Perception account and pretty sure it says Sanchez instead of Paradise)